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Abstract:  This  Article  breaks  new  ground  toward 
contractual  and  institutional  innovation  in  models  of 
homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. 
Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing 
sector  and  other  types  of  public  financing  schemes,  we 
suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such 
as  time-  and  place-based  division  of  property  rights, 
conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the 
systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions 
offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the 
economic  and  legal  institution  of  homeownership:  a  for-
profit  shared  equity  scheme  led  by  local  governments 
alongside  a  private  market  shared  equity  model,  one  of 
“bootstrapping home buying with purchase options.” 
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Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: 
Toward Innovative Models of Homeownership 
INTRODUCTION 
The subprime crisis has vividly demonstrated the risks of relying on rising 
market values to prevent debt from surpassing the value of the security, and the 
severe collective action problem embedded in the securitization of mortgage-
backed loans.
1 
However, the recent turn of events raises more fundamental questions about 
the way in which land-related property rights and credit markets are designed. 
This Article explores these broader-based concerns, and seeks to break new 
ground  toward  contractual  and  institutional  innovation  in  models  of 
homeownership,  equity  building,  and  mortgage  enforcement  that  may 
overcome some of the systemic problems in the real estate market. 
Numerous scholarly endeavors have been made to correct the failures of the 
market.
2 In a recent article, Eric Posner and Luigi Zingales identify the broad-
based deadweight loss of foreclosures, and call to force a renegotiation between 
the  homeowner  and  the  mortgagee  in  cases  of  negative  equity  (when  the 
amount of the debt exceeds the home value). Importantly, they propose to do 
this without making any of the contracting parties worse off or increasing the 
systemic cost of credit.
3 Homeowners in ZIP codes where housing prices have 
dropped below a certain threshold would have a right to a mortgage reduction 
to  the  current  value  in  exchange  for  a  percentage  of  the  home’s  future 
appreciation above the current level.
4 
We  view  Posner  and  Zingales’s  model  of  binding  together  mortgage 
restructuring  with  a  shared  equity  scheme  as  holding  great  potential  for 
reforming the market, and we develop this idea more extensively in this Article 
to include both the public and private sectors. In addition, whereas Posner and 
 
1. See, e.g., Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
(2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020396 (Last visited, July 16, 2010) (offering empirical 
evidence for their analysis of the subprime crisis as a “classic lending boom-bust scenario, in which 
unsustainable growth leads to the collapse of the market”); Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In 
Rescue to Stabilize Lending, U.S. Takes Over Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/business/08fannie.html  (discussing  the  federal  government’s 
bailout of “the nation’s two largest mortgage finance companies,” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
2. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2009) (analyzing the reasons for the crisis, and calling to regulate the mortgage 
market so as to curb abusive practices, while preserving the benefits of high levels of homeownership, 
especially among young, low-income, and minority households). 
3. Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis, 11 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 575 (2009). 
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Zingales’s model focuses on the ex post scenario of mortgage default, we offer 
innovative models for housing development and finance that would ex ante 
address the broader prospects and perils of the real estate market and the legal 
institution of homeownership. 
In so doing, we build on the institutional insights obtained by analyzing two 
innovative  forms  in  current  real  estate  development  and  finance.  First, 
community land trusts (CLTs), which are non-profit community organizations 
that  supply  affordable  housing  based  on  long-term  shared  equity,  divided-
ownership schemes.
5 Second, tax increment financing (TIF), in which a local 
government, working through a subsidiary agency, designates an area for for-
profit development or redevelopment, incurs up-front expenditures (e.g., land 
assembly, public infrastructure), and issues revenue bonds that are paid back 
over time by earmarking future incremental increases in property taxes in the 
designated area.
6 
These  two  forms  substantially  diverge,  and  may  even  be  considered 
outright opposites. CLTs are designed to perpetually maintain housing units at 
below-market affordable prices. Conversely, TIF districts rely on stimulating 
market  value  appreciation  following  the  area’s  redevelopment  as  the  raison 
d’être of the project, thereby enabling the agency to repay the bonds. However, 
each  of  these  forms  offers  broader-based  institutional  lessons  that,  suitably 
adapted,  enrich  the  range  of  design  options  for  the  conventional  for-profit 
housing sector. 
Our Article has two main objectives. First, it offers a tentative outline for a 
type of a CLT/TIF hybrid in the form of a For-Profit Shared Equity (FPSE) 
development model that would allow consumers to acquire full homeownership 
through  a  gradual,  two-phase  purchase  and  finance  process.  Second,  it 
illuminates a broader range of issues that typify the current for-profit real estate 
development  and  finance  market,  by  pointing  to  instances  of  institutional 
myopia and refutable conventional wisdom. Among these topics, we address 
the  insufficient  design  alternatives  for  building  equity  from  zero,  an  all-or-
nothing  approach  to  homeownership,  and  inefficient  risk-shifting  in  case  of 
mortgage  foreclosures.  These  insights  in  turn  play  an  important  role  in 
suggesting general institutional and legal design principles that go beyond the 
suggested CLT/TIF hybrid and may inspire improvements to existing private 
market products in the real estate industry. 
As Part I explains, US local governments currently play an established role 
in  the  real  estate  industry  having  broad  powers  in  land  use  regulation  and 
access to property taxation as their most prominent own-revenue resource. We 
argue that local governments can also play a substantial role in other issues that 
 
5. See infra Part II. 
6. See infra Part III. ARRUNADA-LEHAVI_FORMATTED_FINAL2  1/11/2011  1:22:39 PM 
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up until now have generally been considered to be within the realm of either 
individual  and  market  activity  or  of  higher-level  government  policy  and 
finance. As a low-level entity that nevertheless enjoys established powers of 
collective action, the local government can engage in a variety of activities that 
would provide better access to credit from financial institutions, efficient risk 
management at the local level, and diversity of property formations. 
Parts II and III of the Article elaborate on the institutional and legal features 
of  CLTs  and  TIFs,  respectively,  and  shed  light  on  ways  in  which  local 
governments could take on a more central role in designing innovative models 
of homeownership and housing finance, including the use of various taxation 
mechanisms to facilitate development. 
Our Article, however, does not solely advocate growing intervention by 
local government. More fundamentally, it seeks to inform private entrepreneurs 
about  real  estate  development  possibilities  that  they  might  have  viewed 
skeptically until recently, but which may gain currency in the aftermath of the 
mortgage  crisis.  Specifically,  our  suggested  CLT/TIF  hybrid  scheme  may 
inspire both entrepreneurs and middle to upper income private consumers to 
adopt  new  market  products  which  would  allow  for  a  gradual,  multi-phase 
purchase  of  homeownership.  These  new  market  mechanisms  can  improve 
opportunities for developing and disseminating property models that have been 
traditionally associated with low-income households, while at the same time 
addressing persistent failures stemming from irresponsible lending, inefficient 
risk deflection, and over-fragmentation of interests that have often plagued real 
estate markets. 
Thus, following the detailed discussion of our suggested for-profit shared 
equity scheme in Part IV, we present in Part V an alternative private model 
entitled  “bootstrapping  home  buying  with  purchase  options.”  This  model 
likewise builds on key insights learned from the CLT/TIF settings, but applies 
them  to  an  innovative,  private  contractual  framework.  In  so  doing,  the 
theoretical and institutional analysis offered in this Article could be appealing 
and useful for both advocates of public intervention in the supply of for-profit 
housing  and  those  who  remain  loyal  to  developing  private  market,  non-
subsidized products. 
I.  LOCAL GOVERNMENT STAKES IN HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCE 
Before we set out to explore new models for local government involvement 
in the real estate market, it is essential to briefly survey the current role of 
government in this field. This survey follows the traditional distinction between 
the non-profit and for-profit sectors, with the purpose of arguing that these two 
allegedly distinctive spheres of activity can be successfully combined, or at the 
least gain inspiration from one another, in promoting innovative mechanisms 
for real-estate development and finance. ARRUNADA-LEHAVI_FORMATTED_FINAL2  1/11/2011  1:22:39 PM 
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The  non-profit  sector  has  seen  different  generations  of  government 
involvement, most prominently on the federal level, starting with European-
inspired direct construction of public housing as of the 1930s. Subsidies for 
privately-developed affordable housing were a product of the 1950s, and the 
1970s brought Section 8 demand-side housing vouchers for tenants and mixed-
income projects in which government subsidizes private developments that set 
apart a number of units at below-market prices.
7 These different mechanisms 
share the policy goal of facilitating affordable housing for low- and moderate-
income families. The success of different strategies undertaken over the years 
to achieve this goal has been, and continues to be, much debated.
8 
In contrast to its activities in the non-profit sector of the housing industry, 
government  involvement  in  the  for-profit  market  is  more  difficult  to 
conceptualize. This is so because government regulatory intervention in the for-
profit sector does not adhere to a clearly-defined public policy framework, but 
is  rather  an  amalgam  of  various  types  of  issue-specific  laws  and  policies 
adopted by different levels of government. 
Two  dominant  aspects  of  local  government  power  over  the  real  estate 
market  are  land  use  regulation  and  property  taxation.  These  spheres  of 
government  activity  are  to  a  large  extent  interrelated.  Specifically,  local 
governments “fiscalize” zoning and other land use decisions by leveraging their 
access to the lion’s share of property taxes within their jurisdiction. This means 
that  local  land  use  regulators  that  attach  great  weight  to  the  public 
revenue/public  expenditure  tradeoff  use  their  land  use  powers  as  a  primary 
fiscal tool.
9 Such interconnectivity may have implications that go beyond the 




7. See, generally, Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 983, 988-95 (2010). The constant changes in government policy are not unique to the 
U.S. A 2007 survey of the 27 EU member states demonstrates the enormous changes in these countries 
since housing began to systematically emerge as a social issue in the mid-nineteenth century. West 
European countries have come a long way from the direct provision of public housing to working 
classes and later on to socio-economically disadvantaged groups, with East European countries making 
their own dramatic shifts from the socialist era of predominantly state-owned rental housing. Whereas 
few generalizations are equally applicable to all European states, one can identify a number of general 
trends in recent decades, such as the decentralization of housing policy from state to local governments, 
and  gradual  privatization  of  existing  social  housing  stock  alongside  more  recent  government 
commitments to promote the construction of new affordable housing units (including through public-
private  partnerships).  See  CECODHAS  (European  Social  Housing  Observatory),  HOUSING  EUROPE 
2007: REVIEW OF SOCIAL, CO-OPERATIVE AND PUBLIC HOUSING IN THE 27 EU MEMBER STATES (2007). 
8. Ellickson, supra note 7, at 1012-21 (calling into question the wisdom of many of the different 
strategies employed over the years, and arguing that housing vouchers are superior to mixed-income 
projects). 
9. See Helen F. Ladd, Land Use Regulation as a Fiscal Tool, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX AND 
LAND USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES: UNDERSTANDING THE LINKS 55 (Helen F. Ladd & Wallace 
E. Oates eds., 1998); Amnon Lehavi, Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 VA L. REV. 929, 948-52 
(2006). 
10. See WILLIAM  A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES  INFLUENCE ARRUNADA-LEHAVI_FORMATTED_FINAL2  1/11/2011  1:22:39 PM 
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This land use fiscalization policy may have a systematic property design 
effect  on  the  for-profit  housing  sector.  A  leading  example  is  the  highly 
favorable treatment that residential community associations (RCAs) or “private 
communities” have been receiving from local governments. Cities such as Las 
Vegas now mandate that every new residential development must be governed 
by an RCA, thus facilitating growth and increased tax revenues with minimal 
public expenditures.
11 
The mortgage market presents a different kind of significant governmental 
intervention in the real estate industry. As we now show, while intervention to 
date has been orchestrated from the federal level, the public costs of failures 
and high foreclosure rates in the mortgage market fall to a significant degree on 
the shoulders of local governments.
12 This may justify a reevaluation of the 
allocation of responsibilities, or at least of the level of ongoing involvement, 
among the different levels of government. 
The federal government has played a central role in what is considered a 
national real estate credit market since the introduction of the Federal Housing 
Administration  (FHA)  mortgage  insurance  programs  in  1934.  In  1938  and 
1970, respectively, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were established to supply 
liquidity  to  the  mortgage  market  by  buying  mortgages  from  lending 
institutions. In 1975 the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
13 aimed at 
stimulating private investment in poor areas through targeted public spending. 
More recently, the federal government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
under conservatorship in 2007, and undertook a massive purchase of “toxic” 
mortgage-related securities under The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE,  AND LAND-USE POLICIES 184–206 (2001). The 
term  “exclusionary  zoning”  refers  to  land  use  regulation  that  seeks  to  indirectly  monitor  the 
socioeconomic composition of residents, especially by zoning out residents with relatively low income 
but with high demand for public services such as schools or welfare. A minimum-lot-size requirement is 
a quintessential example of exclusionary zoning. Since the property tax in the US is ad valorem, that is, 
based on a certain fraction of the property’s value, such a regulatory demand would generally keep out, 
through the price mechanism, low-income families that would have decreased the average property tax 
base. For the broad-based societal implications of “exclusionary zoning,” see, e.g., Richard Briffault, 
Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 365–74, 382–84 (1990); 
Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the 
Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1993–95 (2000) (pointing to the ever-present, even if 
currently implicit, racial motives for exclusionary zoning); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of 
Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1894–97 (1994) (same). 
11. Evan McKenzey, Constructing The Pomerium in Las Vegas: A Case Study of Emerging Trends 
in American Gated Communities, 20 HOUSING STUDIES 187 (2005). For RCAs, see generally Sheryll D. 
Cashin,  Privatized  Communities  and  the  “Secession  of  the  Successful”:  Democracy  and  Fairness 
beyond  the  Gate,  28  FORDHAM  URB.  L.J.  1675  (2001);  Paula  A.  Franzese,  Privatization  and  its 
Discontents: Common Interest Communities and the Rise of the Government for “The Nice,” 37 URB. 
LAW. 335 (2005). 
12. See infra notes 16-17. 
13. Pub. L. No. 94-200, §§ 301-310, 89 Stat. 1124, 1125 (1975) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 2801-2810 (2006)). ARRUNADA-LEHAVI_FORMATTED_FINAL2  1/11/2011  1:22:39 PM 
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of  2008.
14  Thereafter,  in  2009,  the  federal  government  sought  to  alleviate 
effects of the mortgage crisis with the Home Affordable Modification Program, 
under  which  the  government  provides  partial  fund  matching  to  reduce 
homeowners’ monthly mortgage payments.
15 
The 2007-08 crisis has raised, however, fundamental concerns about the 
appropriate  scope  and  content  of  the  above-mentioned  government 
intervention. For example, should government intervene more extensively, and 
how, in the real estate credit market to prevent allegedly predatory lending? 
Moreover, it has raised questions about the prevailing division of labor among 
different levels of government, and the sustainability of traditional distinctions 
drawn  between  the  for-profit  and  non-profit  sectors  in  designing  law  and 
policy. 
Regarding the mortgage market, states have recently started to pursue a 
more active role in trying to investigate past mistakes and correct persistent 
failures  in  this  market.
16  But  the  focus  on  government  involvement  should 
perhaps be taken one further level down to the realm of local governments. 
Recent empirical research demonstrates that high mortgage foreclosure rates 
are a problem not only for individual homeowners, lending institutions, holders 
of mortgage-backed securities, and national-level agencies such as Fannie Mae 
or Freddie Mac. Foreclosures also harm neighbors by reducing the value of 
nearby properties, especially when the aggregate rate of physically adjacent 
foreclosures  crosses  a  certain  threshold,  and  this  in  turn  reduces  local 
governments’ tax bases way beyond tax delinquency for foreclosed assets.
17 
Accordingly, we argue that local governments may play a role in issues 
that,  until  recently,  have  been  considered  to  be  within  the  realm  of  either 
individual  and  market  activity  or  of  higher-level  government  policy  and 
finance. The identification of substantial jurisdictional public effects of what is 
 
14. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3766 (2008) (to be codified at various sections of 5, 12, 31 
U.S.C.). 
15. US  Department  of  Treasury,  Home  Affordable  Modification  Program  Guidelines  (2009), 
available  at:  http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/modification_program_guidelines.pdf 
(visited, July 16, 2010). Under this program, the borrower first has to reduce payments on mortgages to 
38% Front-End Debt to Ratio (DTI). The US Treasury then matches further reductions in monthly 
payments, dollar-for-dollar, with the lender/investor, down to a 31% Front-End DTI. The program’s 
success has been questioned, however, since it has been implemented only with a small fraction of 
borrowers. The federal government is currently devising yet another initiative, aimed at encouraging 
delinquent borrowers to shed their houses through a “short sale” in which the property is being sold for 
less than the balance of the mortgage, based on a self-binding real estate valuation commissioned by the 
lender. See David Streitfeld, Program to Pay Homeowners To Sell at a Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010, 
at A1. 
16. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, The States Take On Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010 (reporting 
that all 50 states agreed to conduct a joint investigation into the bank practices that led to the foreclosure 
scandal). 
17. Jenny Schuetz, Vicki Been, and Ingrid Gould Ellen, Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated 
Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 J. HOUSING ECONOMICS 306 (2008); Posner & Zingales, supra note 3, at 
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allegedly a private market issue does not, however, dictate a single type of 
solution.  More  coercive  regulatory  intervention  in  the  market  may  not 
necessarily result in more efficient provision of housing or finance. Instead, 
local  governments  may  opt  for  an  advisory,  mediatory,  or  otherwise  non-
coercive role in broadening the possibilities for homeowners. 
Moreover, local governments could initiate and lead institutional innovation 
in  the  real  estate  market.  For  example,  other  scholars  suggest  that 
municipalities serve as a conduit for matching homeowners and investors for 
the purpose of home equity insurance against fluctuations in local home values, 
or for selling off their upside potential.
18 But municipalities could pursue other 
innovative alternatives as well, and the Article seeks to identify them. 
Specifically,  the  Article  gains  inspiration  from  existing  types  of 
development,  including  Community  Land  Trusts  (CLTs)  and  tax  increment 
financing (TIF) districts, and studies how these models can be adapted and 
applied to other sections of the real estate industry. We start by analyzing non-
profit  Community  Land  Trusts  (CLTs),  which  show  impressively  low 
foreclosure rates even though their beneficiaries are low-income people. We 
identify  the  organizational  and  contractual  features  that  make  this  possible, 
with a view to transplanting some of these features to the for-profit housing 
sector. 
II. THE GROWTH OF COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS (CLTS) 
A. The Institutional and Legal Features of CLTs 
One type of housing development in which local governments have been 
playing a growing role in the past few years is Community Land Trusts (CLTs). 
As of 2010, there are over 240 CLTs, which include more than 6,000 housing 
units across the US.
19 
The CLT is a community-based, non-profit organization that acquires land 
for the purpose of retaining perpetual ownership in it to facilitate affordable 
housing. The individual homeowner leases the land for a long period of time 
(typically, 99 years) and becomes the owner of the building erected on the land. 
The  lease  agreement  on  the  land  divides  the  property  bundle  between  the 
 
18. See Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143 
(2010). 
19. See John Emmeus Davis, Origins and Evolution of the Community Land Trusts in the United 
States, in THE COMMUNITY LAND TRUST READER 1, 3 (J.E. Davis ed., 2010) [hereinafter Davis, 2010]. 
In addition, much of the information included in this Part is based on conversations and correspondence 
with Michael Brown, Burlington Associates in Community Development, LLC; John Davis, Burlington 
Associates  in  Community  Development,  LLC;  Allison  Handler,  Executive  Director,  Portland 
Community Land Trusts; and Roz Greenstein, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. We thank all of them for 
their help. ARRUNADA-LEHAVI_FORMATTED_FINAL2  1/11/2011  1:22:39 PM 
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individual  and  the  CLT  both  during  the  tenancy  and  upon  its  transfer  by 
inheritance or resale. Thus, for example, the homeowner must occupy the land 
as her primary residence, may not sublease the land without the CLT’s consent, 
is  required  to  receive  permission  for  major  capital  improvements,  and  is 
obligated to properly maintain the building.
20 
To keep the land available for affordable housing in perpetuity, the CLT 
repurchases the property or monitors its direct transfer from seller to buyer 
when the homeowner decides to sell the housing unit. In both cases the CLT 
ensures the resale price is restricted to a set formula. Although there are several 
generic approaches to setting the price, the most prevalent mechanism in CLTs 
is one of appraisal-based formulas. These formulas establish the resale price of 
the house by adding to the original price a certain percentage (typically, 25 
percent) of any increase in the home’s market value.
21 The declared goal of this 
resale  formula  is  to  divide  the  gains  from  market  appreciation,  so  that  the 
exiting  homeowner  receives  a  reasonable  return  on  her  investment,  while 
concurrently granting future income-eligible homebuyers fair and affordable 
access to this housing unit.
22 Since the formula establishes a value ceiling and 
not  a  floor,  the  homeowner  is  nevertheless  exposed  to  the  economic  risks 
resulting from declining property values or deterioration in the asset’s condition 
such that the formula-determined price may not be guaranteed.
23 
Another intriguing facet of the CLT concerns its governance structure. The 
CLT  is  typically  an  open-membership  organization  for  all  those  who  live 
within  the  wider  geographic  area  that  the  CLT  defines  as  the  relevant 
community. It is governed by a tripartite board: one-third of board members are 
representatives  of  the  leaseholders/homeowners;  one  third  are  elected 
representatives of other community residents outside the CLT; and the final 
third are co-opted by the first two-thirds, with some of these seats often being 
reserved for local government representatives, private lenders, and other major 
 
20. See Amnon Lehavi, Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137, 199-202 (2008) [hereinafter 
Lehavi, Mixing]. 
21. Other  methods  include  indexed  formulas,  which  link  upward  adjustments  in  the  original 
purchase price to a specific index such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or the Area Median Income 
(AMI). Yet other formulas are “itemized,” meaning that the price is adjusted by adding or subtracting 
specific  factors  such  as  the  value  of  owner-made  capital  improvements;  maintenance,  repairs,  and 
depreciation;  or  inflation  adjustments.  While  self-standing,  itemized  formulas  are  quite  rare,  some 
measure  of  itemization  (e.g.,  owner-made  improvements)  usually  accompanies  the  more  prevalent 
appraisal-based formulas. See Burlington Associates in Community Development, LLC, Community 
Land  Trust  Resource  Center:  Comparing  the  Four  Major  Approaches  to  Resale  Formulas,  2005, 
available at http://www.burlingtonassociates.net/resources/ResaleFormulaComparisons.pdf (Last visited 
July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Burlington Associates]. 
22. See John Emmeus Davis, Shared Equity Homeownership: The Changing Landscape of Resale 
Restricted, Owner Occupied Housing, NAT’L HOUSING INST. 18-23 (2006) [hereinafter Davis, 2006], 
available  at  http://www.nhi.org/pdf/SharedEquityHome.pdf  (Last  visited,  July  16,  2010);  Rosalind 
Greenstein & Yesim Sungu-Eryilmaz, A National Study of Community Land Trusts 4 (Lincoln Inst. of 
Land Policy, Working Paper WP07YS1, 2007). 
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players.
24 
CLTs are welcomed by local governments as a means to foster effective, 
long-term aid to needy families. In 2006, the City of Irvine, California, set up 
the  Irvine  Community  Land  Trust  (ICLT),  with  the  purpose  of establishing 
nearly  10,000  CLT  housing  units  by  2025.
25  More  broadly,  in  a  growing 
number  of  CLTs,  the  entire  one-third  of  external  board  members  is  now 
affiliated with and appointed by the local government.
26 
CLTs have proven a durable affordable housing development strategy even 
throughout the subprime crisis. Though CLTs are intended for and used by 
low- and moderate-income families, their foreclosure rates are consistently low 
at 0.52 percent in 2008, compared with the significantly higher national rate of 
3.3% estimated by the Mortgage Bankers Association in early 2009.
27 These 
outcomes can be attributed not only to the typically lower up-front prices of 
CLT housing units, but also to dynamic front- and back-end measures taken by 
CLTs  aimed  at  mitigating  the  risks  of  insolvency  and  avoiding  inadequate 
foreclosure procedures. 
We identify four broad institutional features of CLTs that point to their 
success, including 1) unbundling rights and subsidies in property configuration, 
2)  mediation  of  access  to  credit,  3)  risk  management  for  prevention  of 
insolvency and 4) lowering the cost of insolvency through the CLT structure. 
1. Affordability through Unbundling of Rights and Subsidies 
The property product designed by CLTs is located at an intermediate point 
along  the  landownership/lease  continuum.  It  divides  the  bundle  of  property 
rights between the individual homeowner and the land trust in an innovative 
manner, rather than opting for the conventional “own all or nothing” strategy.
28 
Given that CLT homeowners purchase only the housing unit and do not 
acquire the land, buyers pay much less upfront for the property, typically in the 
25-30  percent  range.
29  Thus,  unbundling  rights  in  land  and  housing  creates 
affordability  due  to  the  significant  proportion  of  the  property  value  usually 
attributable to the land component, especially in cities and neighborhoods with 
 
24. Lehavi, Mixing, supra note 20, at 199-202. 
25. See IRVINE COMMUNITY  LAND  TRUST, http://www.irvineclt.org/resources/news (Last visited 
July 16, 2010). 
26. See  JOHN  EMMEUS  DAVIS  &  RICK  JACOBUS,  THE  CITY-CLT  PARTNERSHIP:  MUNICIPAL 
SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS 33-38 (2008). 
27. National  CLT  Network,  Community  Land  Trusts  at  Lower  Risk  of  Losing  Homes  to 
Foreclosures (report dated Mar. 17, 2009), accessed at www.cltnetwork.org. 
28. We do not discuss here the largely anachronistic estate system, which still exists in the US and 
in other common law countries, but has lost most of its importance in the modern era. Conventional 
housing in the US is currently governed by the fee simple, which grants full ownership in both the land 
and the home. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 185-96 (7th ed. 2010) 
29. See sources in supra note 19. ARRUNADA-LEHAVI_FORMATTED_FINAL2  1/11/2011  1:22:39 PM 
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high demand for real estate. In addition, buyers usually enjoy a subsidy on their 
purchase  price,  their  monthly  rent,  or  both.  CLTs  tend  to  provide  greater 
subsidies when the land is donated to them. When the CLT has to acquire the 
land, some of these acquisition costs are typically passed on to consumers. This 
cost  may  be  reflected  in  the  up-front  price  of  the  housing  unit,  or,  more 
typically, in the monthly lease fee that is collected by the CLT. As a matter of 
public policy and as part of the incentive structure for potential homeowners, 
subsidies offered by the CLT must be substantial enough to justify the legal and 
economic limits placed on CLT homeowners during and after their tenure.
30 At 
the same time, the pairing of subsidies with the unique property structure of the 
CLT creates an institutional setting that makes the housing affordable for long 
periods of time, including upon resale. 
2. Credit Mediation 
In  mediating  and  facilitating  a  loan  agreement  for  the  house  vis-à-vis 
lenders,  the  CLT  assists  by  narrowing  down  informational  asymmetries 
between the parties to the loan agreement, and by better assessing ex ante the 
financial ability of the borrower to pay back the loan. This is done typically by 
requiring homeowners to undergo training and orientation to explain to them 
the structure of rights and duties in a CLT project as compared to conventional 
home buying, different options for gaining access to credit from commercial 
lenders, the proper ratio to be maintained between the value of the property and 
the  amount  of  the  debt,  and  so  forth.  As  far  as  commercial  lenders  are 
concerned, the CLT is instrumental in clarifying the unique features of the loan 
for  banks,  including:  (1)  that  the  collateral  for  the  CLT  home  purchase 
mortgage is the leasehold estate—the value of home improvements plus the 
value of the leasehold interest in the land, and (2) the favorable loan-to-value 
ratio in CLT leasehold mortgages (because the CLT’s write-down of the home 
purchase price is regarded as equity).
31 Thus, in making both parties to the loan 
transaction—the  homebuyer  and  commercial  lender—better  informed  about 
their respective rights and duties, the CLT harmonizes the parties’ expectations 
and facilitates a transaction whose details, including the interest rate, reflect the 
true prospects and risks assumed on both sides. 
Although the CLT is not a direct party to the loan agreement, it typically 
retains  a  privilege  to  step  in,  in  case  of  mortgage  default,  to  forestall  the 
foreclosure process for a few months in order to work with the borrower to 
avoid foreclosure, to take over the borrower’s interests, or to remove the resale 
restrictions in case of foreclosure or the taking of the deed in lieu. As a result, 
local banks, who become engaged in repeat play vis-à-vis the CLT, are more 
 
30. Davis, 2006, supra note 22, at 19-20. 
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willing to originate mortgages at lower interest rates.
32 
3. Prevention of Insolvency 
CLTs play a preventive or backstopping role in mortgage defaults not only 
during  the  pre-leasehold  negotiation,  but  also  throughout  the  tenure  period. 
Since  the  leaseholders  pay  the  CLT  a  monthly  lease  fee,  and  homeowners 
typically  default  on  a  mortgage  only  after  failing  to  make  other  types  of 
payments, noncompliance with the lease fee payment may serve as an alarm 
device warning the CLT that the homeowner is nearing default on her mortgage 
loan. 
Whereas at this stage the CLT is formally entitled to terminate the lease and 
evict the lessee from the land, it may work either to adjust the leasehold scheme 
vis-à-vis the borrower or, if this is impracticable, to purchase the home from 
the borrower. In the latter case, the CLT would bring the account current vis-à-
vis the lender, and place a lien on the property for the amount of that payment, 
which is then recouped at resale.
33 
4. Lowering Costs of Insolvency 
Finally, in the case of insolvency triggering action by the lender, the CLT 
may take a number of steps to prevent court foreclosure, including exercising 
its prerogative to take over the homeowner’s interests (which is a right of first 
refusal over the home). Even in cases of formal foreclosure, the CLT still owns 
the underlying land and thus has a strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the lender 
or any future buyer of the home.
34 Given that the model CLT ground lease 
allows the CLT to charge market-rate rent if the eventual homeowner is not a 
low-income  household,  in  a  few  real  cases  of  foreclosures,  the  new 
homeowners  voluntarily  agreed  to  re-impose  the  CLT  resale  restrictions  in 
exchange for being charged below-market lease fees.
35 
Put differently, the CLT structure alleviates the “anticommons” fear that 
may be embedded in splitting ownership between the land and the house.
36 The 
CLT has leverage to repurchase the specific home in case of foreclosure, or to 
 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. One may wonder about the incentives of lenders to lend when considering this power. Two 
factors  may  be  important.  First,  CLTs  are  repeat  players  so  they  have  incentives  not  to  behave 
opportunistically  in  any  particular  deal.  Second,  U.S.  lenders,  especially  local  ones,  may  be  under 
regulatory pressure to lend to low-income mortgage applicants. At the same time, the low foreclosure 
rates  in  CLTs  may  encourage  lenders  to  keep  engaging  in  lending  as  compared  to  the  perils  of 
conventional markets. 
35. This was the case, for example, in a number of instances involving the Burlington Community 
Land Trust in Burlington, Vermont. We thank John Davis for this information. 
36. For the concept of “anticommons,” see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: 
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 628 (1998). ARRUNADA-LEHAVI_FORMATTED_FINAL2  1/11/2011  1:22:39 PM 
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otherwise  prevent  a  “checkerboard”  scenario,  in  which  a  number  of 
foreclosures  in  a  CLT  area  will  create  a  divide  among  CLT  and  non-CLT 
homes, a significant issue also for the ongoing collective governance of the 
entire CLT development.
37 
B. CLT Lessons for the For-Profit Market 
The organizational structure and achievements of CLTs are informative for 
rethinking the needs of homebuyers and the solutions applicable in the home 
buying  market.  CLT-derived  general  design  principles  might  therefore  be 
instrumental in expanding the range of options in the for-profit housing and 
finance market. We focus on four main themes that arise in this context: (1) 
extending the possibilities for the gradual building of equity among consumers 
in the housing industry, (2) internalizing the risks and benefits of real estate 
development and finance within the local community, (3) expanding the variety 
of contractual structures in the for-profit real estate market, including in the 
extension of credit, and (4) addressing the potential problems resulting from 
new property format creation, especially of long-term divided ownership in the 
asset. 
1. Equity Building 
The ex ante partitioning of rights in a CLT between the housing unit and 
the land parcel enables consumers to better build equity from zero. Unlike the 
dynamics  of  high-leveraged  loans  that  were  available  through  the  subprime 
market, the CLT model allows low-income families with little or no equity to 
enjoy the benefits of tenure security and internalization of house improvements 
at a more favorable loan-to-value ratio. At a later stage, once the homeowner 
has paid back the loan and accrues more capital, she can choose whether to sell 
the  CLT  home  and  buy  into  conventional  homeownership  at  a  different 
location, or to channel the additional capital to another activity that she deems 
 
37. The problem of over-fragmentation of property rights is one of the major practical impediments 
to the development and redevelopment of land, at times necessitating the use of government coercion 
through the power of eminent domain. But the scope of this power remains a highly controversial issue. 
Thus, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), 
which validated the use of coerced land assembly through eminent domain for purposes of “economic 
development”  as  meeting  the  “public  use”  requirement  of  the  Takings  Clause,  many  states  passed 
legislative reforms limiting to various extents the use of this power. See Edward J. Lopez, Pass a Law, 
Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash, 5(1) REV. L. ECON. 101 (2009). But 
under the latter approach, the problem of “anticommons” would remain intact. For proposals to create 
new mechanisms to curb eminent domain abuse while at the same time preventing an “anticommons” 
deadlock, compare Michael Heller & Roderick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465 
(2008) (calling to subject the group of landowners to a majority rule in deciding whether to accept a 
buy-out offer) with Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704 
(2007) (suggesting an alternative compensation mechanism, by which landowners would be allocated 
shares in a Special Purpose Development Corporation that would consolidate ownership in the project’s 
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to  be  more  valuable  than  the  residual  value  of  regular  homeownership. 
Resorting to a useful terminology in the literature, homeowners in CLTs can 
choose the extent to which they would like to separate the “homeownership as 
consumption” component from the “homeownership as investment” one (i.e., 
the  gamble  on  the  property  future  value),  which  in  conventional 
homeownership are inherently intertwined.
38 
Although under the typical resale formula the CLT homeowner has some 
exposure to the upside potential of market value rise (i.e., the percentage of the 
property appreciation that she keeps to herself), as well as to the downside (to 
the  extent  that  declining  property  values  attach  to  the  housing  unit  or  the 
leasehold rights), the up-front costs of buying into the investment component 
and the consequent exposure to exogenous risks are more moderate in CLTs 
than in regular homeownership, as was explained in Part IIA(1). This allows 
the CLT homeowner to build and invest equity more gradually, while at the 
same  time  retaining  the  flexibility  to  re-bind  consumption  and  investment 
should  she  decide  to  sell  the  CLT  unit  and  transition  to  conventional 
homeownership. 
We argue that the mechanism of gradual equity building along a certain 
time  horizon  can  be  conceptually  extended  in  the  context  of  the  for-profit 
market  to  the  same  physical  asset.  Consider,  for  example,  an  innovative 
development model that would allow a homeowner at first stage to purchase the 
home only and to take a loan against it. Then after repaying this portion of the 
loan, she would be entitled to purchase the residual portion of the asset (the 
land, future development rights, and any other attributes that attach to full-scale 
ownership) and to take a new loan against it. 
Such an option would, however, have to consider an entire array of issues 
pertaining  to  the  interim  period  (i.e.,  who  holds  the  land  rights  during  this 
timeframe), as well as the possibility of continuous asset fragmentation and 
potential deadlock if the second stage of purchase does not materialize. In Part 
IV, we suggest a tentative institutional solution, focusing mainly on the role 
that  local  governments  could  play  to  provide  a  viable  organizational  and 
financial  framework.  This  development  model  could  also  support  private 
contracting in home financing, as explained in Part V. 
2. Internalizing Risks and Prospects within the Local Community 
Two prominent lessons of the subprime crisis have been the moral hazard 
and bargaining problems embedded in mortgage-backed securities. The moral 
 
38. See Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW U. L. REV. 1047, 1054-63, 1070-88 (2008) 
[hereinafter Fennell, Homeownership] (suggesting a scheme by which landowners would transact with 
commercial investors. These investors would ensure homeowners against “offsite” risks such as general 
market trends resulting in decline in their home values, and may also possibly retain a share in any 
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hazard problem generally refers to the possibility that the behavior of a person 
would change after the purchase of insurance so that the probability of loss or 
the size of the loss increases because of the insured’s indifference to the loss.
39 
In the context of the subprime crisis, this problem was caused because the risk 
was shifted away from the original parties to the loan and on to national and 
international investors who had poor information about the risks and prospects 
for each loan. Bargaining difficulties emerged because securitization made it 
harder to renegotiate in case of market decline and default.
40 In particular, it 
made  it  impossible  to  internalize  the  effects  of  foreclosure  decisions  on 
neighboring properties and the community.
41 
Conversely, CLTs are committed to internalizing both risks and prospects 
within the relevant local area—which can be flexibly designed to include a 
single neighborhood, multiple neighborhoods, a city, or an entire metropolitan 
area.  This  means  that  the  CLT  tripartite  board  structure  represents  a  broad 
range of interests within the community beyond CLT residents and immediate 
neighbors,  but  is  nevertheless  integrated  with  the  local  basis  of  CLTs. 
Accordingly, CLT managerial decisions, e.g., about which projects to develop, 
terms of leasehold contracts, resale formulas, and which modes of action to 
pursue in case of insolvency or foreclosure, are bound to consider the broader-
based effects of such instances on the “community.” 
Admittedly, given their governance structure, CLTs may suffer potential 
biases  of  their  own  in  decision-making.  Domination  by  local  interests  and 
partly by debtors may motivate CLTs to defer foreclosures in hard times and be 
slow to accept changes in market conditions up to the point of exhausting their 
endowment. In this sense, although CLTs show very low incidence of default 
and  foreclosure,
42  their  numbers  are  somewhat  hard  to  interpret  given  the 
novelty, the presence of capital (land) and labor (volunteering) donations, as 
well as possible favorable regulatory treatment by municipalities. 
With  these  caveats  in  mind,  the  potential  benefits  of  the  CLT  structure 
might be reflected in adaptation of the role of local governments in housing 
 
39. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 53 (5th ed. 2008). 
40. See David A. Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Anti-Fragmentation Principle in Property 
Law, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (2010). 
41. This is not to say that we rule out the potential benefits of bundling rights to different debt, as is 
done in other context of securitization. This is done, for example, in Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) 
that pool together yielding financial assets such as mortgage-backed loans, credit card accounts, or auto 
loans in a separate legal entity. For these financial structures, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of 
Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 134-44 (1994) (describing how securitization works 
and how companies benefit from it). We also recognize the general sense behind geographical risk 
diversification  by  a  provider  a  mortgage-backed  loans.  However,  as  was  explained  in  the  text 
accompanying supra note 17, outright alienation from the local basis of mortgages may easily result in 
suboptimal risk management. This is so especially because a significant number of foreclosures within a 
certain  geographical  area  results  in  substantial  adverse  externalities  to  local  governments  and 
neighboring residents—a cost that tends to be disregarded by remote lenders 
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finance.  Like  CLTs,  local  governments  have  an  incentive  to  consider  the 
broader-based  effects  of  inefficient  risk  deflection  and  consequent  high 
foreclosure rates on the local real estate market and, moreover, on the local 
economy.
43 Local governments may thus be more prone to intervene to prevent 
distress, e.g., by subsidizing credit ex ante or stepping in, in case of mortgage 
delinquency, to prevent the snowball effect of foreclosures. In parallel, local 
governments  are  generally  motivated  to  internalize  a  portion  of  the  upside 
effects resulting from the collective action, such as by increased tax revenues in 
case  of  market  value  rise.
44  To  the  extent  that  a  CLT-inspired  institutional 
structure could be devised, it would systematically motivate localities to better 
internalize both negative and positive effects. As a result the current scope of 
local government activity in the provision of housing supply and finance could 
be made more effective. Part IV of the Article presents the institutional role that 
local governments could play in what we term For-Profit Shared Equity (FPSE) 
real estate developments. 
As for potential lessons from CLTs for private developers, we do recognize 
that the governance of CLTs may involve substantial costs and be unsuited to 
the  market.  For  example,  CLTs  are  arguably  administratively  lean,  enjoy 
subsidies,  and  focus  on  the  purpose  of  providing  affordable  housing.  But 
potential adaptations of CLT features to the for-profit market and the increasing 
involvement  of  government  agencies  may  make  CLT-like  institutions  more 
costly to operate. We address some of these concerns in Parts IV and V, when 
we  analyze  the  potential  expansion  of  for-profit  shared-equity  institutional 
structures  to  public  agencies  or  to  private  entrepreneurs  through  new 
contractual models for housing finance. 
3. The Scope for Greater Variety of Contractual Structures 
The current for-profit mortgage market has been built around a standard 
model of unified homeownership in which owners-borrowers purchase both the 
land and the building – an inseparable bundle of consumption and investment 
services – thus bearing the whole economic risk of the purchase. CLTs show 
that there might be utility in developing new formulas that allow homebuyers to 
separate these components of homeownership, thereby tailoring their purchase 
decisions more closely to their means and their financial profile. 
Furthermore,  assuming  a  public  policy  of  favoring  affordable 
homeownership, CLTs are starting to demonstrate in the context of non-profit 
 
43. See Fennell & Roin, supra note 18, at 147-50 (portraying the high stakes that local governments 
have, in effect, in foreclosures rates within their territories). 
44. For  the  centrality  of  ad  valorem  (value-based)  property  taxation  in  the  economy  of  local 
governments, and the effect this has on their policy-making, as well as on the fundamental concepts of 
homeownership, see Amnon Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1266-1275 
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housing  that  an  innovative  institutional  structure  may  aid  not  only  needy 
families, but can also alleviate the risk of mortgage insolvency and address 
actual foreclosures effectively. This may consequently make CLTs attractive to 
for-profit  lenders,  especially  local  banks  that  are  better  acquainted  with  a 
specific development.
45 Thus, a richer array of alternatives expanded to the for-
profit sector might promote the interests of lenders, borrowers, government, 
neighbors,  and  other  affected  stakeholders,  including  holders  of  mortgage-
backed securities. 
4. Difficulties of Divided Ownership 
A potential deterrent of formulas resembling the CLT model is that market 
participants may be reluctant to divide ownership. Division can be effectuated 
by different means, such as allocating among different persons the ownership 
of land and building, or granting purchase options to lenders, as suggested in 
Part V below. This reluctance is exemplified by Robert Ellickson’s argument 
that any legal design, based inherently on a long-term lease rather than on full-
scale homeownership, would result in higher ongoing transaction costs between 
the landowner and the tenant.
46 
More broadly, the reluctance toward the division of ownership seems to be 
based on the fundamental concerns rooted in the numerus clausus doctrine: 
multiplicity of property rights may discourage trade, especially when these are 
designed in a very specific fashion. In our case, the exceptionality of divided 
ownership  could  hinder  subsequent  trade  in  land  or  mortgages,  therefore 
deterring the introduction of such formulas. Because of the prominence of these 
arguments against any suggestion for institutional innovation that breaks ranks 
from current property forms, we find it important to address these concerns in 
some detail. We do so by pointing to the success of some previous forms of 
unconventional property formats in the real estate market, while emphasizing 
the  need  to  affect  such  changes  through  legislation  or  another  type  of 
systematic regulation. 
Let us first examine the logic of the numerus clausus doctrine and then 
review some other innovations in divided ownership, to illustrate that there is 
room for introducing innovative arrangements in this area without hindering 
trade. 
The numerus clausus principle is explicit in civil law systems but is also 
highly  indicative,  even  if  more  implicitly  so,  of  the  Anglo-American  legal 
tradition. According to this principle, only certain forms of property rights are 
 
45. Some  mortgagees  hold  these  loans  in  their  portfolio,  while  others  sell  these  loans  on  the 
secondary market or to state/local housing authorities. We thank Michael Brown for this information. 
46. ROBERT  C.  ELLICKSON,  THE  HOUSEHOLD:  INFORMAL  ORDER  AROUND  THE  HEARTH  88-90 
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recognized  as  such  by  the  legal  system.  This  limited  recognition  prevents 
private  parties  from  exercising  their  otherwise  nearly  unbound  transactional 
freedom to shape their legal relationships.
47 Current theory seeks to ground 
such design limits in “optimal standardization,” that is, balancing economic and 
social  demand  for  different  types  of  property  interests  against  the  need  to 
economize  on  information  costs  imposed  on  third  parties  that  have  to 
accommodate  to  such  diversity,  in  view  of  the  in  rem  nature  of  property 
rights.
48 
This does not necessarily  mean that recognized types of property rights 
included in the “closed list,” such as ownership, should essentially adhere to a 
single blueprint, i.e., an indivisible fee simple interest in both the land and the 
home.
49  At  the  same  time,  for  new  models  that  “rearrange”  ownership  to 
become formally institutionalized, the new format needs not only to become de 
facto familiar to various stakeholders, but should also be supported by enabling 
legislation and regulation. This support and familiarity would allow actors such 
as lenders to fully understand the nature of the property configuration and the 
type of collaterals, and consequently to be willing to extend credit. We argue 
that such systematic changes may, and do, take place when the introduction of 
innovative  design  models  is  shown  to  effectively  address  new  or  adapted 
patterns of market demands, as the following examples illustrate. In this sense, 
although  the  numerus  clausus  principle  imposes  a  structural  constraint,  it 
should not be understood as blocking dynamism and innovativeness.
50 
An early example of a non-conventional housing form, which started in the 
US in the late nineteenth century and has been applied in both the non-profit 
and  for-profit  sectors,  is  cooperative  housing  (co-op).  The  owner  of  the 
building  is  the  cooperative  corporation,  and  each  shareholder  of  the  co-op 
corporation  is  entitled  to  a  proprietary  lease  in  a  unit  within  the  building 
 
47. See  UGO  MATTEL,  BASIC  PRINCIPLES  OF  PROPERTY  LAW:  A  COMPARATIVE  LEGAL  AND 
ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 39 (2000). 
48. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, 24-42 (2000). But this approach has had its critics. 
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argue that third party considerations might require contracting 
parties  to  effectively  publicize  nonstandard  arrangements,  alongside  the  employment  of  other 
verification rules, but that these considerations do not justify an overall ban by the legal system on 
creating  new  and  efficient  proprietary  forms.  Henry  Hansmann  &  Reinier  Kraakman,  Property, 
Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 373, 395-409 (2002). 
49. For actual and normative differences that exist in the design of “recognized” property rights in 
various social contexts or for different types of resources, see, respectively, Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of 
Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1558-70 (2003) (discussing “institutions of property” ranging from 
those  regulating  arm-length  market  transactions  to  marital  property);  Amnon  Lehavi,  The  Property 
Puzzle, 96 GEO. L. J. 1987, 1997-2000 (2008) (noting that different values implicate the ordering of 
rights to various resources). 
50. Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 
1600-02 (2008) (portraying numerus clausus as “the common framework through which legal systems 
define and mediate property interests,” thus enabling dynamism and change in the closed list’s content 
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(typically for 99 years). Since the purchaser of a co-op unit actually purchases 
shares  in  the  corporation,  when  she  borrows  money  for  this  purchase,  the 
mortgage  is  secured  by  a  pledge  on  the  shares.  In  addition,  most  co-op 
corporations also borrow money secured by a mortgage on the real property 
(“blanket mortgage”), so that the owner of a co-op unit makes two types of 
periodic payments: one on her own mortgage, and another for her pro rata share 
in the blanket mortgage. Co-ops are still prevalent in the affordable housing 
sector,  but at  the  same  time  are persistent  also  in New York City’s  luxury 
market because of their stronger control over tenant selection.
51 
This co-op arrangement was made popular by private initiative alone.
52 In 
contrast, condominiums became an established property phenomenon only after 
the different states had passed enabling statutes during the 1960s, and the FHA 
had started to provide mortgage insurance for this type of tenure in 1961.
53 The 
demand  for  enabling  statutes  resulted  from  the  need  to  incorporate  into 
property law the then-innovative condominium legal structure. Statutes enabled 
the condominium owner to own her unit in fee simple absolute but share a pro 
rata  undivided  interest  in  the  common  elements  (inner  streets,  parks,  joint 
facilities) as a tenant in common with the other condominium owners. Within 
about a decade after these Acts, condominium developments started to emerge 
as  the  most  prevalent  form  of  multi-family  buildings  across  the  US.  The 
success of condominiums thus serves as a vivid illustration to our claim that 
innovating housing forms should not be blocked outright simply because of the 
numerus clausus principle.
54 
A third type of common interest community, the Residential Community 
Association  (RCA)—a  planned-unit  development  that  is  governed  by  a 
homeowners’ association—has also become a roaring success throughout the 
US.  The  growth  of  this  type  of  development  was  helped  by  state-enabling 
legislation and general judicial support for the RCA’s governance mechanisms. 
The  core  of  the  community  property  governance  lies  in  the  conditions, 
covenants,  and  restrictions  (CC&Rs)  included  in  the  RCA’s  governing 
documents. These reciprocal obligations, recognized as equitable servitudes, 
control and regulate commonly-owned assets and amenities as well as the use 
 
51. See Michael H. Schill, Ioan Voicu, and Jonathan Miller, The Condominium versus Cooperative 
Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 282-86 (2007). We 
do not discuss here the social desirability of such screening mechanisms, and whether these attributes 
should be imported in any way to the new FPSE model suggested in Part IV of the Article. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 277-78. 
54. See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax 
Subsidies, and  Tenure Choice,  20  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  25,  26-30  (1991). We  do  not  refer  here  to  the 
potential comparative advantages of condominiums over cooperative housing, and vice versa—an issue 
which has been addressed to some extent in the literature. See Hansmann, supra; Schill et al., supra note 
51. Our intention here is only to show that innovative housing forms are not being blocked outright 
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of  privately-owned  housing  units.  Beyond  enforcing  CC&R  pre-fixed 
provisions, the association is empowered to make  managerial decisions, lay 
down rules, and even amend at times the governing documents without the 
need for unanimous homeowners’ consent.
55 
The lessons deriving from these types of innovative institutional design of 
housing development and finance are: 
•  That  models  that  deviate  from  the  “classic”  fee  simple 
homeownership  have  merit  not  only  in  the  affordable  housing 
sector, but also in the for-profit market, in which consumers have a 
genuine choice among property forms and may moreover attach a 
market  premium  to  certain  types  of  developments  that  involve 
some level of shared ownership and governance. 
•  Any type of “bottom-up” innovativeness must not only take firm 
root among consumers, lenders, and governmental agencies, but 
also usually gain top-down authorization and support to overcome 
economic  and  legal  hurdles.  This  is  true  as  a  matter  of  both 
economic reality (i.e., the potential of a new institutional product to 
penetrate  the  market)  and  legal  design.  This  has  been  vividly 
demonstrated  in  the  essentiality  of  enabling  legislation  for  both 
condominiums and RCAs. 
In principle, private entrepreneurs or local governments looking to design 
innovative property regimes that divide homeownership property rights along a 
certain  time  horizon  could  resort  to  types  of  defeasible  estates  or  future 
interests in the Anglo-American legal system or to existing types of legal trusts 
for the interim periods during such multi-phase housing projects. However, it 
seems that for such new housing patterns to become widespread and clearly 
identifiable to developers, consumers, financiers, and other third parties, new 
legislation  would  have  to  be  tailored  to  the  specific  traits  of  such  projects. 
Government support would not only address property aspects but also special 
tax considerations that may be involved in a multi-stage model of real estate 
purchase. 
This  need  may  be  even  more  acute  in  civil  law  systems,  which  are 
traditionally detached from the fragmentary estate system and have aimed at 
designing ownership as a “unified box.”
56 In legal reality, property rights in 
land in civil law countries are less “pure” than conventionally depicted. Spain, 
for  example,  legally  enables  separating  the  ownership  of  land  from  that  of 
buildings erected on it (“derecho de superficie”), as is also the case with the 
 
55. See LEE  ANNE  FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY 
LINES 67-95 (2009); Lehavi, Mixing, supra note 20, at 160-66. 
56. See John Henry Merriman, Ownership and Estate, 48 TUL. L. REV. 916, 927 (1974) (explaining 
that under the Romanic theory of property, the “box of ownership” contains rights, “including that of use 
and occupancy, that to the fruits or income, and the power of alienation”). ARRUNADA-LEHAVI_FORMATTED_FINAL2  1/11/2011  1:22:39 PM 
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Erbbaurecht in Germany.
57 And yet some initiatives to use this separation in 
affordable  housing  have  been  viewed  unfavorably  by  potential  buyers  as 
producing “imperfect” or “crippled” rights.
58 Thus, since CLT-like schemes do 
not  fit  comfortably  within  the  property  forms  that  are  widely  known  and 
understood by developers, consumers, and third parties, an enabling top-down 
reform  would  probably  be  essential  to  make  the  form  viable.  This  would 
facilitate a genuine competition among property forms, a competition which 
does not sacrifice clarity and stability for the sake of allowing consumers and 
real estate developers a wider range of choices. 
III. TAX INCREMENT FINANCING DEVELOPMENT 
We  now  move  on  to  examine  a  different  kind  of  development  or 
redevelopment  scheme,  which  might  be  used as  a  complement  to  CLT-like 
initiatives: the Tax Increment Financing (TIF) district. Although municipalities 
have  always  used  policy  tools  aimed  at  fostering  local  economic 
development,
59  TIF  schemes  have  dominated  since  their  origination  in 
California in 1952.
60 
A TIF scheme enables a redevelopment corporation, which is a subsidiary 
of  the  local  government,  to  incur  expenses,  including  up-front  costs  of 
assembling land and setting up public infrastructure. In order to finance these 
significant  costs,  the  redevelopment  agency  raises  capital  from  the  general 
public by issuing revenue bonds in securities markets. These revenue bonds are 
paid back over time by earmarking future incremental increases in property 
taxes within the designated area. This means that throughout the period, until 
the bonds are paid in full (typically around twenty years from issuance), the 
redevelopment  agency  does  not  have  to  share  the  incremental  revenues 
resulting  from  increased  property  values  with  all  other  taxing  agencies  that 
regularly  receive  a  share  of  the  property  taxes  (such  as  counties,  school 
districts,  and  special  service  districts).
61  Thus,  because  the  property  tax  is 
calculated at a certain percentage of the property’s market value, and since the 
redevelopment allegedly fosters an overall increase in real estate prices, the 
 
57. See  Uría  Menéndez,  Issues  in  Ownership  of  Real  Estate—Spain  (Lex  Mundi  Publication, 
2008), available at http://lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/PracticeGroups/RealEstate/Survey2/Spain.pdf 
(visited, July 16, 2010). For the Roman law origins of the legal institution of hereditary building rights 
on another person’s land, see HEINRICH  VOGT,  DAS  ERBBAURECHT  DES  KLASSISCHEN  ROMISCHEN 
RECHTS (1950). 
58. For the lengthy process of learning to accept the CLT model, with its “unusual characteristics of 
ownership,” as a legitimate option in the American real estate industry, see Davis, 2010, at 26-39. 
59. See, generally, DOUGLAS C. NORTH, GROWTH AND WELFARE IN THE AMERICAN PAST (1966). 
60. See  J.  Drew  Klacik  &  Samuel  Nunn,  A  Primer  on  Tax  Increment  Financing,  in  TAX 
INCREMENT  FINANCING  AND  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT:  USES,  STRUCTURES,  AND  IMPACTS  15,  17 
(Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001). 
61. See Rachel Weber, Tax Increment Financing in Theory and Practice, in FINANCING ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 53, 55 (Sammis B. White et al. eds., 2003). ARRUNADA-LEHAVI_FORMATTED_FINAL2  1/11/2011  1:22:39 PM 
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initial investment is covered over time by increased property tax revenues. 
The redevelopment agency typically enters into agreements with different 
developers for the sale of land and its development in accordance with the 
redevelopment scheme. In states such as California, redevelopment agencies 
are entitled at times to participate directly with the developer in the profits of 
the project, beyond the receipt of taxes.
62 This may be so when the parties 
disagree  on  the  value  of  the  land  because  of  differing  estimates  about  the 
project’s future economic value so that part of the payment is deferred to actual 
performance. The agency’s participation in the project’s cash flow allows it to 
recover  expenditures,  such as  for  parking  and  highway  interchanges,  which 
could not have been recouped as part of the price of the land.
63 
TIFs have also been a source of controversy. Critics argue that TIFs often 
do not generate net municipality-wide gains that could not have been otherwise 
attained.
64  They  further  argue  that  TIFs  are  used  merely  to  shift  existing 
economic activity to the TIF district, so that the alleged gains are offset by 
negative impacts on non-TIF parts of the municipality.
65 Other research does 
point to genuine appreciations within TIFs.
66 
Regardless  of  disputes  over  the  cost-effectiveness  of  local  government 
action in certain TIF districts, the TIF scheme relies on institutional traits that 
place local governments in a unique position to provide real estate markets with 
the benefits of collective action. Further, the scheme can be better attuned to 
local  characteristics,  the  interconnectivity  among  different  projects,  and  the 
 
62. See DAVID F. BEATTY ET AL., REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA 199–218 (3d ed. 2004) 
63. For  the  legal  validity  of  TIFs,  see,  for  example,  In  re  Request  for  Advisory  Opinion  on 
Constitutionality of 1986 PA 281, 422 N.W.2d 186, 191–96 (Mich. 1988) (rejecting the argument that 
TIF is a constitutionally impermissible diversion of school districts’ tax funds under Michigan law). 
Some states do, however,  limit the ability of redevelopment agencies to receive all tax increments 
generated from the project’s area. See, e.g., BEATTY ET AL., supra note 62, at 212–18 (describing such 
mitigating constitutional and statutory provisions in California). 
64. In many states, including California, the legal authority to set up a TIF district hinges on the 
“but for” criterion, meaning that the local government is required to demonstrate, when it formally 
establishes a TIF district, that private investment in the designated TIF area would not occur “but for” 
the  stimulus  provided  by  public  investment.  See  Jan  K.  Brueckner,  Tax  Increment  Financing:  A 
Theoretical  Inquiry,  81  J.  PUB.  ECON.  321  (2001).  Naturally,  since  this  “but  for”  determination  is 
regularly made at the initial point of designating the TIF district, a retrospective analysis may yield 
different  conclusions.  This  potential  gap  is  thus  one  source  of  the  criticism  of  the  TIF  structure, 
discussed in the text accompanying infra note 65. 
65. See  Michael  Dardia,  Subsidizing  Redevelopment  in  California  29  (1998),  available  at 
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=70 (visited, July 16, 2010) (noting that where an increase in 
tax revenue is due to general trends in the real estate market, TIFs act as involuntary subsidies from 
counties  and  school  districts  to  cities);  Richard  F.  Dye  &  David  F.  Merriman,  The  Effects  of  Tax 
Increment  Financing  on  Economic  Development,  47  J.  URB.  ECON.  306,  307  (2000)  (arguing  that 
competitive government bidding could be a zero-sum game with gains to some, offset by losses to 
others); Weber, supra note 61, at 63 (noting studies showing evidence that a positive effect on growth in 
property value in TIF districts is offset by a negative impact in non-TIF districts of the same city). 
66. See Brent C. Smith, If You Promise to Build it, Will They Come? The Interaction between Local 
Economic  Development Policy and the  Real  Estate  Market: Evidence  from  Tax  Increment Finance 
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public/private interplay within a defined geographical area. We do not claim, of 
course,  that  local  governments  are  inherently  superior  to  either  private 
entrepreneurs or to state or federal agencies in crafting any type of development 
and  finance  scheme.  In  particular,  local  governments  have  encountered 
financial hardships in the aftermath of the recent economic crisis.
67 Thus, our 
basic  assumption  is  that  private  developers  are  generally  more  efficient 
producers of for-profit housing units for conventional homeownership or the 
renting market. But at the same time, we do suggest that local governments, 
low-level  collective  action,  and  property  tax  mechanisms  can  be  employed 
more broadly to provide new design options. 
A. Low-Level Collective Action and Securitization 
The work of municipal-level entities in assembling land, providing public 
infrastructure,  and  accessing  up-start  credit  by  issuing  earmarked  municipal 
bonds can be adjusted to different types of development models. Nevertheless, 
attention  should  be  paid  to  the  potential  abuse  of  such  powers,  e.g.,  in  the 
coercive use of eminent domain for the hidden purpose of rent-capturing at the 
expense of landowners.
68 This fear should not entirely block the potential for 
innovativeness. But it may justify constraining and monitoring new schemes 
involving local governments as entrepreneurs, direct or indirect financiers, or 
developers, so as to prevent such abuse. 
Special focus should be given here to the ability of local governments to 
build  equity  through  the  use  of  specific-revenue  municipal  bonds.
69  In 
examining  the  pros  and  cons  of  securitization  in  the  real  estate  market, 
municipal bonds do seem to be an attractive option for risk management, since 
their scope is not too small to result in financial breakdown following a small 
number of foreclosures, but not too dispersed to create a kind of subprime, 
inefficient risk-deflecting. Moreover, to the extent that the collective debt of the 
agency can be conceptually and legally separated to some extent from debts 
incurred for individual housing units, i.e., in the collateral for the loans, such 
collective bonds could actually be combined with the extension of additional 
credit to developers and consumers. 
 
67. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Cities in Debt Turn to States, Adding Strain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
4,  2010  (describing  the  growing  hardships  of  municipalities  to  pay  back  debts  and  to  meet  other 
obligations such as pensionary ones, due to a variety of reasons, including a dramatic decline in tax 
revenues). 
68. See sources in supra note 37. See also Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in 
Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 18–31 (2006) (arguing that the ability of secret buying agents to overcome holdout problems 
associated with assembling large tracts of land mitigates private parties’ need for eminent domain). 
69. For the way these municipal bonds work, in the land development context, see BEATTY ET AL., 
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B. The Development Planning Function of Taxes 
The TIF mechanism points to the multi-faceted development potential of 
taxes. This potential takes multiple forms, as a passive incident in an existing 
private economic activity, and also as a full-fledged planning tool. The TIF 
mechanism allows local governments to create incentives for development and 
to diversify the sources of equity by seemingly reversing the order of events: 
obligating part of the future stream of public revenues up front as a market-
reliable mechanism for raising private capital.
70 
However, as is the case with government collective action, such innovative 
use  of  tax  mechanisms  should  tread  the  fine  line  between  not  sticking 
stubbornly to a conservative view of taxing as future contingent capital, and not 
rushing  into  ex  ante  adventurous  gambles  on  this  source  of  revenue  at  the 
expense of the taxpaying general public. This design principle is especially 
challenging in the context of ad valorem property taxation,
71 since it relies on 
what  is  allegedly  exogenous  to  both  government  and  individual  actors:  the 
price  equilibrium  of  the  real  estate  market,  influenced  also  by  extra-local 
variables. 
Accordingly, the use of tax innovation to create new types of development 
and  finance  models  should  always  identify  the  optimal  scale  of  economic 
stakeholding.  Factors  to  be  considered  are:  (1)  whether  chief  risks  and 
prospects should be managed at the local or sub-local (neighborhood) level, (2) 
the type and scope of the public collateral for the up-front equity raising, and 
(3) how future prospects and risks would be shared between the government 
and  private  developers  or  consumers  upon  actual  implementation  of  the 
project.
72  With  these  considerations  in  mind,  we  borrow  some  of  the 
institutional features of TIF districts for our design of a new tentative model for 
housing supply and finance, which we now present. 
IV. A SUGGESTED PUBLIC MODEL: FOR-PROFIT, SHARED EQUITY (FPSE) 
DEVELOPMENT 
As stated at the outset, the various institutional insights from both CLTs 
and TIFs suggest possibilities for creating two new types of financial and legal 
design models. Part IV describes a model for innovative public initiatives, and 
Part V will develop an application for the private sector. 
 
70. For the tax mechanism as a chief planning tool for local governments, see sources in supra 
notes 61-63. 
71. For the principles and mechanisms of ad valorem property taxation in the US, see generally 
JOAN YOUNGMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN PROPERTY VALUATION AND TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(1994). 
72. See Fennell & Roin, supra note 18 (discussing “understaking” and “overstaking” of the various 
actors in residential choices and outcomes, both within the boundaries of local governments and beyond 
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At  this  point,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  once  again  that,  even  if  our 
suggested model involves a public initiative, this does not stem from any sort of 
general proposition by which the public sector is superior to the private market 
in developing and financing housing. In general, we are inclined to believe it is 
the other way around. Our model below is based, rather, on an “institutional 
engineering”  perspective,  which  seeks  to  take  advantage  of  existing 
mechanisms and institutions that are currently available to the public sector and 
to  local  governments  in  particular.  Further,  it  explores  the  possibilities  of 
adapting them to a different setup. Any similar economic and legal engineering 
devices developed through private institutions would be truly commendable. 
The model developed below should thus be seen as a general invitation for 
institutional innovativeness and not as praise for the public sector as such. 
That said, what we entitle a For-Profit, Shared Equity (FPSE) scheme seeks 
to integrate some of the key features of CLTs and TIFs, and designates an 
important  role  to  local  government  in  facilitating  this  type  of  development. 
Under the FPSE, a development agency,  which is a subsidiary of  the local 
government,  would  acquire  land  and  approve  a  detailed  land  use  plan  for 
development. These up-front costs would be covered by the issuance of bonds 
and secured by the revenue stream of property taxes in the manner detailed 
below. 
The FPSE would involve two main phases. During the first stage (which 
starts  at  time  0),  buyers  would  be  entitled  to  purchase  the  building  and  a 
market-rate,  long-term  leasehold  on  the  land.  The  buyer  would  be  able  to 
approach  any  commercial  lender  and  take  a  mortgage  loan  that  would  be 
secured  by  the  value  of  the  building  and  the  leasehold.  At  this  stage,  the 
development agency retains ownership of the land and entitlement to all future 
development rights. 
If  at  any  time  during  the  first  stage  the  homeowner  fails  to  pay  the 
mortgage or the leasehold rent, the development agency would have the right to 
step  in,  in  a  similar  manner  to  CLTs,  including  a  right  to  evacuate  the 
homeowner or to purchase the house from the borrower and bring the loan 
current vis-à-vis the lender. 
At the end of the first stage’s designated period, t, (which could typically be 
somewhere  between  five  and  ten  years),  if  the  homeowner  is  able  to 
demonstrate  to  the  development  agency  that  she  is  meeting  her  contractual 
commitments  to  both  the  agency  and  the  lender,  she  would  be  entitled  to 
exercise an option to purchase the residual components: i.e., fee simple on the 
land, entitlement to future development rights, and all other rights that attach to 
fee simple ownership (the “residual ownership”). 
We suggest that whereas the option would be legally granted at time 0, its 
price would be determined at time t and would be set at the difference between 
the asset’s full market price and the current value of the rights that are already ARRUNADA-LEHAVI_FORMATTED_FINAL2  1/11/2011  1:22:39 PM 
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held by the FPSE homeowner at this point.
73 In case of disagreement between 
the parties, the price of the option for the purchase of the residual ownership 
would be set by third party arbitration, the procedural terms of which would be 
determined in advance by statute. Whereas the option would be of some value 
at time 0, because it would grant the homebuyer the right of first refusal to 
purchase the residual ownership at time t for an objective market value (rather 
than for a price subjectively agreed to by the development agency), such an 
option’s  value  at  time  0,  before  any  specific  investments  are  made  by  the 
homebuyer (such as, for example, having friends and schooling children in the 
neighborhood), would be low, so that it does not impinge on the affordability of 
the original FPSE transaction. Setting the exercise price at the market level also 
makes the option as profitable in downturns as in upturns. 
There are two possible outcomes depending on the ability and willingness 
of the homeowner to exercise the option: 
•  If  the  homeowner  decides  to  exercise  the  option,  she  would  be 
entitled to take a second loan with any commercial lender. At this 
stage,  the  collateral  could  be  the  entire  fee  simple  right  of  the 
homeowner, subject to a priority of the first lender over the rights 
to the leasehold and the housing unit, if the first loan has not yet 
been paid in full. As with the first loan, the development agency 
would be entitled to intervene in cases of mortgage default. 
•  Conversely,  if  at  the  end  of  the  first  stage,  the  homeowner  is 
solvent  but  nevertheless  declines  the  option,  the  development 
agency  would  be  granted  a  right  of  first  refusal  of  its  own  to 
repurchase the home and the leasehold upon any instance of resale 
by the homeowner. In addition, the agency would elect whether to 
retain the residual ownership, or to sell its rights onwards to a third 
party, including the said right of first refusal on the home and the 
leasehold. 
Consider Martha, who contemplates whether to buy a conventional home in 
the market, or an otherwise identical house in a FPSE project, both located in 
the city of Summerville. The price of a regular home is $100,000. The price of 
the  FPSE  home  is  $60,000,  reflecting  the  fact  that  during  stage  0,  Martha 
doesn’t have to buy the residual ownership components—including the land—
which are valued in the market at $40,000. Assuming, for simplicity, a 10% 
interest rate, no debt amortization, and a $10,000 down-payment, the annual 
interest  paid  on  the  mortgage  would  decrease  from  $9,000  to  $5,000  when 
 
73. We do not suggest to restrict the sale of the homeowner’s rights before time t in the way it is 
done with the formula-based sale in CLTs. Thus, to the extent that these rights would increase in value 
when the homeowner sells between Time 0 and time t, the homeowner would enjoy this appreciation. 
The subsequent buyer would be subjected, however, to the rights and duties of the original buyer vis-à-
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moving from a conventional transaction into a FPSE. The difference would 
provide  for  the  rental  fee  and  would  provide  a  smoother  path  into 
homeownership, alleviating the risk of insolvency. 
The decision regarding the second stage, which starts at time t, should also 
implicate the tax revenue scheme, which secures the bond that had been issued 
upfront by the development agency. One possible scheme could be that during 
the set first stage, the development agency would be  entitled to receive all 
property taxes from the asset that are paid by the homeowners. If at the second 
stage the homeowner exercises her option to buy the residual ownership, the 
municipal development agency would be entitled to receive exclusively from 
then onwards only the incremental property tax for the duration of the bond, as 
with TIFs, but the pre-development tax baseline would be allocated among the 
different taxing jurisdictions (including counties, school districts, and special 
service  districts).  If  the  homeowner  does  not  exercise  the  option,  the 
development agency would be able to continue receiving all tax revenues from 
the  asset  up  to  the  duration  of  the  bond,  unless  it  passes  on  the  residual 
ownership to a private purchaser during the term of the bond. 
Moreover,  the  entitlement  of  the  development  agency  to  receive  all 
property taxes if the homeowner fails (willingly or unwillingly) to exercise the 
option, and the dependence of the agency on tax revenues to pay back the 
bonds,  provide  incentives  for  the  local  government  to  act  promptly  and 
effectively against homeowners/leaseholders who fail to pay either the monthly 
rent payment or the mortgage, and to avoid lengthy foreclosures proceedings 
and/or long-term vacancy or abandonment of the property, shifting the property 
to more efficient use as fast as possible. 
Overall, the FPSE system would provide an additional option to current 
development  and  finance  formats.  In  essence,  it  would  grant  prospective 
homeowners  a  better  opportunity  to  gradually  build  equity  and  to  make  a 
reasoned decision about the investment of incremental capital to purchase the 
residual  ownership  at  the  end  of  the  first  stage.  Accordingly,  the  potential 
deviation from a conventional ownership model need not result in excessive 
over-fragmentation of rights in the asset, once mitigating measures such as a 
right of first refusal are introduced. 
Moreover, the fact that the development agency would select the type of 
housing  covered  by  the  FPSE  system  precludes  the  possibility  that 
homeowners’ individual decisions might defeat its goals. In other systems that 
also  attempt  to  increase  affordability  and  reduce  homeowners’  risk, 
homeowners may hypothetically react by purchasing bigger houses, ending up 
with more or less the same level of risk of insolvency. This risk would be 
substantially,  even  if  not  entirely,  countered  under  the  FPSE  through  the 
discretion of the development agency in selecting the size of houses included in 
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In so doing, the FPSE model would be better able to systematically attain 
two different but related social policy goals: (1) increasing the affordability of 
housing in the for-profit sector by breaking up the property’s purchase into two 
distinct stages (buying the home at time 0 and deciding only later whether to 
exercise the residual ownership option at time t); and (2) lowering the level of 
insolvency risk as compared to conventional homeownership models in the for-
profit sector. 
From the local government’s perspective, an FPSE-like model allows it to 
engage in an economically feasible plan to foster growth and guard against the 
ill-effects of badly regulated lending (with respect to, for example, the volume 
of lending being provided to subprime borrowers) and negative, community-
wide externalities of concentrated mortgage foreclosures. Further, the model 
can improve the incentives for local government to act more efficiently in both 
its regulatory and fiscal capacities. Even if such schemes are not feasible for all 
kinds  of  local  governments,  the  possibilities  of  designing  new  models  that 
borrow some of these institutional insights from both the for-profit and non-
profit sectors can reinvigorate the real estate market and expand consumers’ 
genuine  choices,  especially  in  separating  the  consumption  and  investment 
components in housing decisions.
74 
V. A SUGGESTED PRIVATE MODEL: BOOTSTRAPPING HOME BUYING WITH 
UPTURN OPTIONS 
The core feature of CLTs—providing affordability without increasing the 
risk  of  default—could  be  usefully  introduced  into  private  home  buying 
contracts. This could be achieved by lowering down-payments and granting 
options to lenders, in a manner that would decrease the chances of default and 
foreclosure in an economic downturn. Observe that CLTs develop their strategy 
by: 
1.  allocating  to  the  CLT  initial  ownership  of  the  land  and  most 
elements of home appreciation; 
2.  contracting several conditional options, which include, at least, an 
option for the CLT to intervene in case of default; and 
3.  managing a complex contractual arrangement by which the CLT 
selects and monitors purchasers, administers the prices of land and 
rentals, and performs sophisticated default-avoidance procedures. 
At its core, the CLT strategy is grounded in sharing the increased value that 
homes  reach  during  economic  upturns  in  order  to  finance  partial 
homeownership. It is unclear what the cost of CLTs’ administration would be 
and, consequently, to what extent they need subsidies to operate. However, 
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whatever the level of these subsidies, a pure unsubsidized for-profit solution 
would  likely  have  to  be  institutionally  simpler  to  be  self-sustainable  in  the 
market. 
Private markets could achieve a similar “bootstrapping” effect by granting 
lenders (or other agents) an option to buy the home in economic upturns.
75 The 
value of this option would therefore finance better access conditions for home 
purchasers. It would lower down-payments or debt, possibly setting the level of 
debt  below  the  minimum  value  that  the  home  is  expected  to  reach  in  a 
recession, thereby minimizing exogenous default. 
To explain how the system might work, let us use the graphical tool often 
used in finance to represent options. Figure 1 depicts the conventional home 
purchase arrangement in which the purchaser borrows to buy the home. The 
horizontal axis represents the market value of the home, which is assumed to be 
a random variable with distribution δ1. There is a positive probability of default 
when home value is lower than L1, the amount of debt, this probability being 
graphically represented by  the gray area in  Figure 1. The vertical axis also 
represents  the  same  market  value  of  the  home,  with  the  different  functions 
representing the accumulated values (with the total being represented by a 45º 
line), and the areas between the functions representing the value achieved by 
each party (lender and borrower), which vary with home value. 
 

















75. For  the  legal  structure  of  options  implicating  property  rights,  and  a  useful  guide  to  “call 
options”  (options  to  buy)  versus  “put  options”  (options  to  sell)  in  this  context,  see  IAN  AYRES, 
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In turn, Figure 2 represents a highly stylized version of the CLT model, in 
which (1) the CLT owns the land; (2) the buyer borrows L2 (lower than L1, as 
CLT buyers do not buy the land) and (3) purchases the building, acquiring also 
a lease on the land. Buyers also get an option to sell their rights to a subsequent 
buyer receiving a certain fraction (typically 25 percent) of the appreciation in 
the home’s market value.
76 Parameters in Figure 2 are set so that the probability 
of  default  is  zero  considering  δ2,  the  probability  distribution  of  the  value 
obtained  by  the  purchaser  when  entering  the  deal.  This  is  only  a  minor 
exaggeration of the common prudent practices followed by CLTs. Obviously, 
the complex contractual structure defining a CLT can make the equity portion 
greater or smaller to compensate for the size of down-payments.
77 
 
















Lastly, Figure 3 represents a possible purely private arrangement in which 
the purchaser buys the home, financing it with a loan L3 plus the present value 
of a call option granted to the lender or a third party (not necessarily private), to 
be exercised at strike price Xt in a future moment t. The home value distribution 
in this case is the same as in Figure 1. The value of the option is driven by the 
substantial positive probability that the home value will be above Xt (the gray 
area to the right of the distribution). This positive probability should make the 
initial purchase considerably  more affordable, by lowering either the down-
payment or the loan. 
 
76. Under the appraisal-based formula, appraisals are typically done for the building alone, not for 
the combined value of the land and the building. Some CLTs, however, appraise the value of both the 
land and the building, use a ratio to determine how much of the property’s value is owned by the 
homeowner, and then apply the said percentage to the appreciation. See Burlington Associates, supra 
note 21. 
77. We assume that the 25 percent appraisal-based resale formula does not have a further ceiling 
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Figure 3: Distribution of claims under mortgage financing with buyer selling an 
















This third system would therefore provide affordability and at the same 
time  limit  the  investment  component  in  home  buying.  Its  main  cost  would 
result from the fact that, in order to make homes affordable, the call option 
would need to be valuable and, therefore, the strike price would need to be low 
enough,  so  that  the  option  would  often  be  exercised,  triggering  eviction  or 
renegotiation of a similar agreement at time t. 
However,  the  system  would  offer  a  substantial  advantage  to  the 
conventional arrangement: renegotiations would take place in times of bonanza 
instead of ruin and with homeowners receiving a substantial amount of money 
(the difference between Xt and L3), which they could use to buy the same or a 
different home. 
Nonetheless,  as  explained  up  to  here,  the  system  would  provide  little 
incentive  for  homebuyers  to  invest  in  their  property.  The  option  facilitates 
bargaining at time t but discourages any home-specific investment by buyers, 
including  home  maintenance;  investments  could  easily  be  expropriated  at 
moment t by the option holder. Therefore, a necessary but incomplete palliative 
is for the contract to add verifiable maintenance expenses to the option strike 
price  so  that  the  homeowner  is  reimbursed  for  undertaking  these  specific 
investments. This element would be somewhat reminiscent of the repurchase 
formulas in CLTs. In addition, to encourage a more balanced renegotiation at t, 
the buyer could retain an option to repurchase the home at a later time, let us 
say  2t  at  strike  price  X2t.  In  case  the  holder  of  the  first  option  decides  to 
exercise it at t, the previous buyer would be evicted, paid Xt-L3 and given an 
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renegotiate such a repurchase as early as time t, thus avoiding eviction in the 
first place and allowing the homeowner to obtain fee simple rights in the land 
and structures on it. 
This  secondary  option  should  not  be  of  much  value  at  time  0,  as  it  is 
conditional on two consecutive upturns in the market in the two periods under 
consideration. Its introduction in the original contract would somewhat reduce 
but not eliminate the affordability provided by the system. However, it would 
be valuable at time t, in case the first option is being exercised, and generally 
before t, when the market goes up and exercise of the first option becomes 
likely. This should at least provide buyers with better incentives to invest in the 
home. 
Our  scheme  is  partly  similar  to  the  “shared-appreciation  mortgage” 
developed in the US during the late 1970s and also sold in the UK in the 1990s, 
in which borrowers pay back both the loan and all or part of the interest with a 
share of the future increase that the value of the property may enjoy at the end 
of the loan period.
78 The two models differ substantially, however, in several 
respects, making our scheme generally more flexible. 
First, our model allocates to the lender the whole of the appreciation above 
a certain threshold, if she exercises the call option at time t, enhancing both 
affordability and simplicity in the design and implementation of the transaction. 
As  in  shared-appreciation  mortgages,  the  principal  of  the  loan  is  an 
unconditional obligation, so that if the property’s value decreases, the borrower 
would still owe it. However, under our model the exercise price of the option 
can be set up low enough to make it very unlikely that the value of the home 
will be lower than that of the loan. 
Second,  our  scheme  does  not  require  third-party  appraisals.  This  is 
important, considering that the difficulties of appraisals has hampered other 
schemes, such as shared-appreciation mortgages.
79 The simpler structure of our 
model  would  facilitate  valuation  and  make  both  mortgages  and  options 
attractive to the secondary markets. Shared-appreciation mortgages might also 
suffer from adverse selection and moral hazard problems which, to be cured, 
require even more complex structures, such as a gradually-increasing “shared-
equity rate” in favor of the lender, as proposed by Caplin et al.
80 
 
78. As  hinted  by  Andrew  Caplin  et  al.,  Shared-Equity  Mortgages,  Housing  Affordability,  and 
Homeownership (Fannie May Foundation, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983100 (visited, 
July 16, 2010), at 1-2 [hereinafter Caplin et al., 2007]; Anthony B. Sanders & V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., 
Shared Appreciation Mortgages: Lessons from the UK, 14 J. HOUSING ECON. 178 (2005) (describing a 
version developed in the 1990s by banks in the UK). 
79. Andrew Caplin et al., Facilitating Shared Appreciation Mortgages to Prevent Housing Crashes 
and Affordability Crisis 9 (Discussion Paper 2008-12, The Brookings Institution, September 2008), 
accessible  at 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/0923_mortgages_caplin/0923_mortgages_caplin.pdf 
[hereinafter Caplin et al., 2008]. 
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Finally, our suggested model may, at first glance, create unease in view of 
the possibility that the homebuyer would have to evacuate if the lender decides 
to  exercise  the  call  option  and  the  homeowner  does  not  exercise  her  own 
repurchase  option.  But  the  shared-appreciation  mortgage  may  inadvertently 
cause much harsher results. Under such a scheme, at the end of the loan period, 
the borrower would have to pay back a substantial lump-sum amount reflecting 
the  paper-gain  appreciation  at  a  time  when  she  would  typically  have  little 
liquidity.  This  would  force  the  homeowner-borrower  to  either  take  a  new 
conventional loan to cover the original one or sell the house to a third party to 
meet  her  obligation.  This  would  typically  result  in  the  same  threat  of 
evacuation,  but  with  the  addition  of  excessive  searching,  negotiation,  and 
transaction costs. Conversely, under our model, the two parties are already well 
acquainted, and can start renegotiating in advance of time t. Moreover, in our 
model,  it  is  the  lender—and  not  the  borrower—who  has  to  generate  the 
financial resources to exercise the call option, if she so elects. 
CONCLUSION 
The US housing industry is in dire need of institutional innovativeness for 
alternative development and finance schemes. Specifically, it needs schemes 
that  do  not  systematically  result  in  the  ill  effects  of  irresponsible  lending, 
inefficient  risk  shifting,  and  high  foreclosure  rates  that  have  broader-based 
snowball effects for local economies. 
This  Article  delineates  the  legal  and  economic  contours  of  two  new 
solutions, which could be applied for restructuring both public initiatives and 
private  contracting.  The  solutions  build  on  empirical  observations  from  the 
non-profit  sector,  and  identify  more  general  institutional  design  principles. 
Some  design  principles  we  examine  are  the  unbundling  of  property  rights, 
gradual  equity  building,  conditional  subsidies,  internalizing  of  risks  and 
prospects within the local community, and employment of tax mechanisms to 
foster  development.  In  so  doing,  the  Article  makes  a  major  step  toward 
developing  innovative  legal  models  of  homeownership,  ones  that  would  be 
sustainable and enduring for both downturn and upturn eras in the American 
economy. 
Our two proposals overcome some of the common defects in alternative 
systems. In particular, both are superior to the mere provision of information to 
home buyers. Information alone is insufficient when incentives are intrinsically 
unsound.  In  such  cases,  no  amount  of  information  would  improve  the 
outcome—a change of incentives is needed. Our proposals set out two possible 
routes toward such a change in both the public and private spheres. 